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The application of the rational choice postulate to a political context invariably 
leads to the conclusion that most voters are ill informed when making the decision for 
whom to vote. In this paper, the authors do an empirical evaluation of the rational 
ignorance theory, based on the results of the 1997 Portuguese Local Elections. The 
results only partially sustain the hypothesis of rational ignorance, although it is also 
possible  to  identify  several  limitations  that  prevent  the  establishment  of  definite 
conclusions in this specific field. 
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The debate about the virtues and limitations of democracy constitutes a question 
that cannot be eluded by those involved in the analysis of political issues. One of the 
most frequently identified limitations results from the voter’s insufficient information 
and the possible use of this by the political representatives and lobbies. Several studies 
consider that the voters'  generalized lack of information can result in the proliferation of 
legislation favouring specific interests, with extremely negative consequences for the 
general welfare
1. Therefore, it is important to establish if voters are in fact not well 
informed when they decide who to vote for, and what are the social costs resulting from 
this lack of information. 
In this paper, we try to answer the first part of the question, indirectly evaluating 
the quantity of information held by voters. To that extent we have based the study on 
the model developed by Rogoff and Sibert (1988), and have assumed that voters better 
informed reward political candidates who show better performances. The information 
held by voters is determined by the proximity between electoral results and indicators of 
economic performance, controlling the influence of other factors that decide the vote, 
such as the candidate' s ideology or image. The levels of performance are established 
through the construction of an empirical frontier using the Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) methodology. 
The study is organized in the following manner: in the first part, we make a brief 
reference  to  the  theory  of  rationality  of  ignorance  and  the  implications  usually 
associated to it. The second part concerns to the formalization of a model of the rational 
voter' s choice, identifying the factors that influence in the vote decision. Subsequently, 
these factors are included in a function of electoral approval, estimated in the final part 
of the study. Finally we analyse the results, try to answer the question underlying this 
study and identify some of its limitations. 
                                                





2. Voter ’s information acquisition  
The application of the rationality axiom to the characterization of the voter' s 
behaviour, as what was originally elaborated by Downs (1957), inevitably leads to the 
conclusion  that the voter is insufficiently informed when deciding who to vote for. 
Confronting  costs  and  benefits,  the  rational  voter  quickly  concludes  that  it  is  not 
worthwhile investing hard to get information, when its only purpose is to decide more 
correctly the vote. A comprehensive knowledge of the political programmes, as well as 
of  their  influence  in  the  general  welfare,  necessarily  implies  high  costs.  Since  the 
benefits  of  voting  in  the  party  that  shows  more  possibilities  to  meet  the  voter' s 
expectations are practically nonexistent, there aren’t sufficiently strong incentives that 
lead  the  average  person  to  seek  the  adequate  political  facts.  If  their  vote  cannot 
influence the election results, the person sees no reason to be better informed
2. 
Several studies establish the extremely negative social welfare implications, a 
result of an apparent under investment in information by the voter. The major problems 
are linked to the eventual manipulation of the public opinion by the government and 
lobbies to meat their own interests. In the first case, the government can use voter' s 
ignorance to avoid an evaluation too severe of its performance, assuming a behaviour 
similar  to  the  manager  in  the  theory  of  the  agency.  Similarly  to  the  "principal"  in 
Holmström’s model (1979), voters have no direct information on the efforts carried out 
by the government, thus ignoring if it is responsible for some specific situation, or, on 
the contrary, if that results from the combined action of exogenous factors
3. In this 
context, the government can carry out policies that may harm the interests of the general 
population without being accounted for them. For instance, the government can promote 
                                                
2 In this case, it is not the fact that the benefits associated to the acquisition of information are difficult to 
achieve that prevent this investment, but because there are no benefits. In practice, the rational agent will 
tend  to  base  his  decision  only  on  the  information  that  doesn' t  mean  significant  costs,  namely  the 
information conveyed by the media, or in crude proxies such as the aspect or the candidate' s charisma, 
unless he gains personal advantages with that information. 
3  At a  political level,  this  problem  tends to  assume greater proportions,  because,  and contrary to the 
company owner, the ordinary voter sees no reasons to invest in information and consequently lessen his 
doubts. While the shareholder may greatly benefit from acquiring information, the voter sees virtually no 
advantage in being well informed. Consequently, we would expect that, at a political level, the lack of 




the artificial expansion of the economy in a pre-electoral period, hindering the desired 
balance of the steady-state, as it was originally proposed by Nordhaus
4. 
Correspondingly, voters'  ignorance makes them particularly vulnerable to the 
influence exerted by lobbies. Due to general political ignorance, most voters don' t know 
exactly what policies they would like to see implemented. Using this, lobbies can then 
mould  the  public  opinion  to  their  benefit,  leaving  out  the  negative  aspects  of their 
political proposals and building cause-effect relationships easily apprehended and seen 
as acceptable by the voters. Lobbies may even interfere in the definition of political 
programmes (Stratmann, 1991) by gaining influence and a privileged statute with those 
in office. In a context of "rational" ignorance, the contributions offered by these groups 
can  have  a decisive role in the electoral results
5, making  the  political parties more 
sensitive to their solicitations. The natural consequence will be the distortion of the 
political market in favour of measures that represent significant gains to some people
6 
and negative consequences for most of the others (Gwartney and Wagner, 1988).  
Several  authors  present  an  alternative  view  on  the  voter’s  behaviour.  These 
authors admit that voters may be sufficiently informed to cast their vote or at least the 
lack  of information they  have  is not  enough to produce the  consequences we have 
described above
7. The arguments presented rely on the virtues of competition in the 
political market and on the gains on the preservation of the brand name and reputation 
of political parties and candidates. Wittman (1989), for example, defends that political 
parties and candidates will tend to transmit reliable information, since omissions and 
untruths will be used by opposite political parties in their own benefit. According to this 
author,  the  strong  competition  between  parties  will  allow  voters  to  recognize  the 
negative  side  of  the  political  proposals  defending,  this  way,  those  who  have  more 
efficient proposals. 
In  our  view,  the  hypothesis  that  the  ignorance  of  voters  has  negative 
repercussions  on  the  functioning  of  the  political  market  is  more  probable  than  the 
                                                
4 See the link established by Nordhaus (1989) between the voter’s rational ignorance and the occurrence 
of political business cycles. 
5 In a situation where rational ignorance prevails, the familiarity of the candidate becomes a determinant 
factor for the choices made by the voter, which could be enhanced by intensified publicity (Mueller and 
Stratmann, 1994). 
6 Olson (1967) refers that only small, cohesive groups, with selective benefits to the membership could 
avoid the  free-riding problem associated with the publicness of the benefits of collective action, thus 
becoming successful in the political market-place.   




alternative view. The specific characteristics of this market, namely indivisibilities of 
choices,  impossibility  to  change  outcomes  for  a  certain  period  of  time  and  the 
impossibility to account for the intensity of voter’s preferences reduce substantially the 
incentives for voters to search information
8. Moreover, political parties may follow a 
strategy of ambiguity
9 and voters, insufficiently informed, may not be able to recognize 
deviations from political programs.  
Despite  the  arguments  in  favour  and  against  each  hypothesis  on  the  voter’s 
behaviour, it is clear that there is a lack of empirical work on the subject. In this paper 
we try to fill in this space by specifying a model of the rational voter’s choice and 
empirically testing it for Portuguese local elections data. 
  
3. Rational voter’s choice: a model. 
Two types of agents are considered: political representatives (candidates and 
leaders) and voters. Each agent operates intending to achieve maximum expected utility: 
his or her conduct is rational. 
Let us assume that there are no fundamental differences in the behaviour of each 
individual as an ordinary economic agent or as a political representative. In any case, he 
will  adopt  an  optimising  perspective,  trying  to  maximise  the  expected  value  of  a 
personal utility function. In the case of political candidates, only two for simplicity’s 
sake
  10, the main arguments of their function are the prestige, the authority and the 
public  recognition  associated  with  being  in  office.  Apart  from  these  arguments,  an 
enhancement of social welfare is implicitly considered, taking into consideration the 
consumption of private and public goods in the community. We assume that none of the 
candidates would profit from implementing policies that would reduce social welfare, 
because such policies would have negative repercussions in future elections and also 
because, as citizens, they would also suffer with such policies. However, these policies 
may be implemented if voters are not able to fully comprehend their negative effects, 
and if they secure a better chance of victory (for instance, by ensuring support from 
groups that directly benefit from such measures). The combination of these effects is 
considered in the utility function of the candidates, described in equation 1:                
                                                
8 See, for example Rowley and Vachris (1993). 
9 See, for example, Alesina and Cukierman (1990) and Mueller and Strattmann (1994). 




                 
                      








I p g C V U , ￿ ￿ + = g g                      (1) 
In this equation, Vt represents the utility derived by the candidate when in office [ Vt = 
f(q),  q = {prestige, authority, social recognition,...}] and C(gt, pt) the consumption of 
public goods and services (gt) and of a private composite good (pt), representative of all 
the private goods in the economy. gt is the discount rate.  
   As  to  the  voter,  we  assume  that  his  welfare  positively  depends  upon  the 
consumption of goods and services and that the choice of a political representative has 
significant implications on its value. Based on the concept of competence developed by 
Rogoff and Sibert (1988), and considering everything else constant, we have established 
that the most competent candidates will be able to provide an enlarged assembly of 
public goods and services without burdening the voter-tax payer with more taxes: 
 
t t t TI g e + =                                                      (2)  
 
gt =  volume of public goods supplied 
TIt = tax revenue 
et = competence of  the political leader 
 
Therefore, voters will tend to choose the most competent candidates, who will 
win the elections. The well-informed rational voter chooses the candidate that gives 
more guarantees of an increased consumption of goods and services, ensuring access to 
higher levels of utility
11. 
We  represent  the  voter' s  expectations  mechanism  in  relation  to  the  future 
competence of the candidates in a way similar to the Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and 
Rogoff (1990). These authors consider that the expectations regarding the incumbent 
candidate  are  different  from  the  expectations  regarding  his  opponent.  The  former’s 
present  performance  constitutes  a  relevant  indicator  as  to  the  candidate’s  future 
achievements, whereas there is no information on the opponent’s current achievements, 
thus providing no predictions as to future performance. In our opinion, this reasoning 
                                                
11 The definition of competence shows a close proximity to the notion of economic efficiency. In fact, it 
is accepted that the most competent candidate is the one who manages more efficiently the resources 




seems to make perfect sense. The opposition cannot compete with the government, due 
to the simple fact that they cannot in fact govern. The situation is similar to a monopoly, 
since the “installed producer” can only carry out production, broadly understood. It is 
generally assumed that the voter is aware of this situation and that he does not regard 
the  “promises”  made  by  the  opponent  candidate  as  sufficiently  credible  elements 
capable  of  providing  indications  on  future  performance.  The  voter  realizes  that  the 
candidates’ interests are distinctive from social welfare, recognizing that promises can 
be of little value in a context potentially characterized by political opportunism. 
The  formalisation  of  competence  is  achieved  by  a  first-order  moving  average 
process: 
1 , , , - + = t I t I t I a a e                                                (3) 
eI, t = Competence of the party i during the period t 
aI, t = Stochastic process i.i.d. 
 
Equation 3 shows that the voter evaluates the competence of the candidates in office by 
their present actions, ignoring information about the opposition candidate for that same 
period
12. We consider that it is pointless to analyse information prior to the present 
mandate, since the voter has already considered it during the last election
13. Therefore, 
the voter will compare the expected value of the future competence of the candidate 
presently in office with an “average” value of competence, which is determined by the 
knowledge of the probable distribution of that factor. The more competence showed by 
the present candidate, considering that all other variables remain constant, the more 
chances he has of being re-elected. 
From  our  point  of  view,  this  reasoning  does  not  contradict  the  rational 
expectations mechanism, since we are considering that the voter will base his decision 
on the anticipation of his future utility. We consider that the best way to anticipate the 
candidate’s future competence (which conditions the voter’s future utility) is by being 
well informed about his present performance. Although the competence of one given 
candidate may change over time, it is definitely associated with his prior performance. 
                                                
12 Being a first-order moving average, past information on this candidate is disregarded, even though the 
candidate has already been in office. It is accepted that that experience is already so far in the past that its 
evaluation is neglected by the voter. 
13 The only important thing in each election is recent information produced during the last mandate and 




At the same time, the fact that a period of time occurs between the constitution of 
information  and  its  effective  appropriation  determines  that  the  decision  regarding  a 
future event may be basically backed by past information. 
Apart from the “competence” factor, it is assumed that the candidate’s ideology 
and  personal  charisma  are  relevant  elements  considered  by  the  rational  voter.  The 
former is seen as a guiding element for the voter, who will elect a candidate, among 
others equally competent, whose positions on fundamental policy goals and priorities 
for resource distribution are the closest to his own. According to our model, this factor 
can  be  integrated  in  the  voter’s  consumption  function,  introducing  a  qualitative 
dimension into the achieved consumptions. Thus, the voter is sensitive to the relative 
valuation attributed by the candidate to the different public goods, together with the 
efficiency associated with the management of resources. 
Finally, the candidate’s charisma or empathy is represented as a first-order moving 
average process, similar to that applied to the “competence” factor: 
 
1 , , , - + = t i t i t i I b b                                                 (4) 
 
Ii, t = Image of the party leader i during the period t 
bi, t = Stochastic process i.i.d 
 
This representation, based on the work of Rogoff and Sibert (1988), proposes to 
establish the eminently dynamic character of the image factor, subject to the erosion 
associated to public exposure and popularity fluctuations. The fact that it presents the 
structure of a MA (1) process permits that the candidate’s image at a given moment in 
time be related with his image in the past; thus, his future value can be based on current 
information. 
In relation to the candidate presently in office, adopting these assumptions implies 
that staying in office depends on how voters will evaluate his competence, all the while 
controlling  aspects  related  with  ideology  and  image.  Each  one  of  these  factors has 
repercussions on levels of welfare, so they are, directly or indirectly, connected to its 
utility function: 




























,                  (5) 
 
In this function, the repercussions of the candidate’s competence are anticipated 
by their influence in the consumption of public or private goods (gt and pt) and on the 
level  of  tax  revenue  (TIt).  The  ideology  of  the  candidate  has  repercussions  on  the 
relative importance of each good and public service (wi) and, finally, the image of the 
candidate has direct influence on the utility function, described by the effect It
14. 
The rational voter anticipates the future value of each component during the 
candidate’s last mandate, choosing the one that ensures the best expected utility level. 
The anticipation is based, fundamentally, on the performance of the candidate presently 
in office. He will win the election if the expected competence, image and ideology show 
a positive differential in relation to the other candidate
15. Therefore, the percentage of 
votes for this candidate is directly related to the level of competence shown during his 
mandate, controlling the aspects related to other factors. 
 
4. Electoral results and the performance of candidates 
 
The model developed in the previous section establishes that the re-election of 
the  candidate  in  office  depends  upon  the  level  of  competence  shown  during  his 
mandate, apart from the ideology and charisma effects. Based on the 1997 Portuguese 
Local Elections, we have defined proxies to reflect each factor. 
In  respect  to  the  factor  competence,  the  DEA  method  was  used  in  the 
construction of an empirical production boundary for the municipalities under study
16. 
For that effect, we have considered each municipality in each year of the mandate prior 
to the 1997 elections as a different DMU
17, according to the procedure mentioned, 
among others, by Boussofiane et al. (1991). The efficiency indices were estimated using 
                                                
14 T represents the time horizon of the voter, µ the discount rate used by the voter (µ < 1), and C and Z are 
regular functions strictly concave, C’g,>0 and Z’<0. 
15 Identified with the average value of distribution. 
16The use of parametric methods of efficiency estimation would demand an explicit identification of the 
underlying functional form of the technology, which is a particularly difficult matter when dealing with 
public sector organizations. In this sense, we have decided to use a method with minimal technical and 
behavioral assumptions such as DEA.   




the  Windows  Warwick  DEA  software  (version  1.02),  from  the  perspective  of 
minimizing inputs and variable returns to scale.  
In  the  definition  of  the  inputs  and  outputs  included  in  this  model,  we  have 
considered the areas of enterprise privileged by the Portuguese municipalities. Along 
with the inputs, we have decided to use the "total value of current expenditure" (CEXP), 
considering the work and capital expenditure made by the municipalities
18. 
In relation to the outputs, the selection process was based on a general analysis 
of  responsibilities  assigned  to  the  local  Portuguese  authorities,  followed  by  the 
definition of indicators that best describe their performance in the period under study. 
Although  Portuguese  legislation  attributes  a  particularly  intervening  role  to  local 
authorities
19,  economic  and  social  development  being  their  ultimate  objective,  in 
practice their role seems more limited, given the excessive concentration of expenditure 
in traditional areas. In fact, nearly two thirds of the available resources are spent in 
administrative costs, fixed costs (such as water supply and drainage) and urbanism. 
The emphasis on traditional areas leads to the selection of outputs that reflect the 
services supplied, described in Table 1, together with the sources that provided the 
information
20: 
In  order  to  give  credibility  to  the  matching  originated  by  DEA,  we  have 
considered only the municipalities with a similar number of inhabitants and acceptable 




                                                
18  The  use  of  an  expenditure  variable  instead  of  real  consumptions  was  due  to  the  impossibility  of 
obtaining adequate proxies of the capital factor. Since the municipalities have access to the same capitals’ 
market and pay their employees according to the same salary tables, it seems acceptable to consider that 
there is no spatial variation of prices, and, consequently, confirms that the levels between efficiency-cost 
and technical efficiency don’t show a significant variation. 
19 Articles n. 235 and 237 of the Portuguese Constitution, D.L. 100/84 and Law n. 25/85. 
20 There was not enough information on the variable ROADS for the year 1997 and on the WASTE and 
WATER variables for the year 1994. To fill in the gap of the first variable we used the 1996 values. In 
relation to WASTE and WATER, we obtained the total expense in these services for the year 1996, and 
divided it by an estimation of its unitary price, obtaining an estimation of the quantities supplied. 
21 The qualitative evaluation was based on the conditions of the equipment used to supply those services. 
Therefore, we have  analysed the  condition  of  the water  collection sources,  lift  stations, water mains, 
Water Treatment Stations and reservoirs used in water supply; in the drainage system, we have analysed 
the conditions of the water collection systems, lift stations, water mains, interceptors, pumps, Residual 
Water Treatment Stations and municipal septic tanks, and, finally, the urban solid waste dumps: we have 
analysed  the  condition  of  the  different  solid  waste  processing  and  disposal  sites.  (Source:  INE- 





To  analyse  the  explanatory  capacity of  the  chosen indicators  on the amount 
spent by the selected municipalities, we have estimated the total cost function defined in 
equation 8 by ordinary least squares: 
 
i i COMP i ROADS
i SEWAGE i PUPILS i WASTE i WATER i CEXP
e a a
a a a a a
+ + +
+ + + + + =
6 ln 5
ln 4 ln 3 ln 2 ln 1 0 ln
       (8)             
This  equation  includes  the  previously  defined  variables  in  logarithms, 
representing the coefficients ￿i (i =1,...,5) the elasticities of expenditure with respect to 
each one of the indicators. We have also considered a dummy variable COMP, which 
identifies  the  municipalities  that  possess  separate  companies  of  water  supply  and 
sewage, as well as those that have granted a concession of those services during the 
period under study. In those cases, the total expenditure in supplying water or treating 
residual  waters  is  not  included  in  the  CEXP  variable,  therefore,  we  expect  the 
coefficient associated to this variable to have a negative sign. 
The results of the parameters’ estimation, for the years 1995 and 1996
22, are 
presented in Table 2: 
The  results  attest  to  the  significance  and  explanatory  power  of  the  chosen 
indicators,  legitimating  their  use  in  the  assessment  of  cost  efficiency  of  the 
municipalities  under  study.  The  adjusted  R
2  is  very  high,  showing  the  overall 
significance  of  regression.  For  all  six  variables  the  estimated  coefficients  have  the 
expected sign, positive with respect to the service indicators and negative in the case of 
the COMP variable. All coefficients are statistically significant, with the sole exception 
of the urban solid wastes collected, with a p-value always higher than 10%. However, 
we  have  decided  to  include  this  variable,  which,  in  the  regressions  made  with  all 
municipalities
23, is always statistically significant to a level of significance of 1%, due 
to the importance of the collection and processing of urban solid wastes within the 
competences attributed to the Portuguese municipal authorities. 
                                                
22 Since it was not possible to gather complete information on all the variables for the whole period under 
study, we have only considered the years of 1995 and 1996, thus ensuring more reliable conclusions. In 
any case, the estimate of identical regressions for the years of 1994 and 1997, would lead to similar 
results 
23 Not considering the quality of the services supplied, the total number of municipalities would reach 




Considering the described data
24 we have applied the DEA method, obtaining 
the results presented in Appendix 1. 
  These results identify a considerable number of inefficient units: from a total of 
148 DMU’s (37 municipalities over 4 years), 95 present indices of relative efficiency 
below 100%. The average (in) efficiency level of these units is 78.2%, which shows that 
it would be possible to achieve the same results with a cut of nearly 22% in the costs.   
In order to proxy the ideological component, we have considered the European 
Parliament  elections’  results  for  the  selected  municipalities
25,  to  establish  the  local 
importance  of  the  candidate’s  party.  In  the  vast  majority  of  municipalities,  the 
difference between the achieved results in the Local and in the European Elections is 
not very significant, revealing that voters are sensitive to issues of ideological nature 
when  they  decide whom to vote for. Candidates supported by political parties with 
strong local implantation have, from the outset, greater probabilities of winning the 
election.  Nevertheless,  in  a  considerable  number  of  municipalities  (18.5%  in  1989, 
10.5% in 1993 and 20.4% in 1997), the differences between the results of the two 
elections are extremely high, more than 20%
26. In the municipalities under study, the 
results achieved by the party during the local elections are higher than the percentage of 
votes achieved in other elections, consequently, the basis for the vote was not founded 
on a strict ideological evaluation but on the candidate' s individual characteristics. 
Evaluation  of  the  importance  of  those  characteristics  (included  in  our 
formulation of the “image” component) consisted in, on the one hand, analysing the 
impact of the second mandate candidate on the electoral results achieved by his party, 
and, on the other hand, in establishing the relationship between that impact and the 
period in office. At the outset, the fact that the "incumbent" candidate intends to run for 
a second mandate should have a positive influence in the electoral results, due to a 
wider public recognition and visibility from having been in office.  
In the Portuguese case, the candidate' s individual characteristics, together with the 
well-known  incumbency-bias  phenomenon,  seem  to  have  a  major  influence  in  the 
                                                
24 In the municipalities with separate companies responsible for providing water or water and drainage, 
the value of the variable CEXP, includes, along with their administrative costs, an estimate of the costs of 
providing those services. The values of this variable have been deflated by the public expenditure deflator 
for all municipalities, in order to compare their values according to the different years. 
25 Following a procedure already used by Costa (1997). 




electoral results. In several occasions the candidate was re-elected with the political 
support of a different political party, and there are even situations when the candidate 
changed more than once of political party without losing the support of the majority of 
voters. Apparently, the long period in office by such large number of candidates and the 
significant  number  of  re-elections  achieved,  give  strong  indications  that  the 
incumbency-bias phenomenon has again a predominant influence. 
Having established the indicators that allow us to consider the factors included in 
the  model  previously  developed,  we  have  estimated  the  electoral  approval  function 
expressed in equation 9: 
 
i i i i v DPREC NDREC REC IDEO DEA PER + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 0 b b b b b b        (9)    
                    
In this equation, PER represents the percentage of votes of the party that won the 
1993  local  elections  in  the  1997  elections.  IDEO  expresses  the  ideological  effect, 
representing the result achieved in the municipality by the same party (in percentage) in 
the 1999 European elections. DEA is the "competence" factor estimated in a twofold 
process. In a first approach (estimate (1)), we have considered the average efficiency 
indices calculated for each municipality according to the DEA method. Since the use of 
this  indicator  could  lead  to  the  misconception  that  candidates  from  traditionally 
inefficient municipalities, but who had accomplished good results during their mandates 
would be penalized, we have considered in a second estimation the rate value of the 
annual average variation of the DEA indices in the period under study. REC is a dummy 
variable that assumes the value of 1, in case the leader elected in 1993 decided for a 
second  mandate  in  the  1997  elections;  its  inclusion  is  intended  to  identify  the 
advantages associated to the candidate’s “name” and benefit from the public recognition 
accumulated during the time in office. NDREC and DPREC are interaction variables 
(NDREC = ND*REC and DPREC = DP*REC), ND being a dummy variable with the 
value  of  1,  in  the  case  the  candidate  had  previously  been  elected  for  at  least  two 
mandates, and DP represents the number of inhabitants per square Km living in a given 
municipality.  The  NDREC  variable  was  included to confirm if the influence in the 
electoral  results  of  a  sympathetic  figure  increases  with  time  in  office.  Finally,  the 




which  states  that  the  image  and  public  recognition  of  the  candidate  is  higher  in 
municipalities with greater costs of information; vi is the stochastic disturbance term. 
As  established  in  the  previous  analysis,  it  is  expected  that  the  coefficients 
associated to the variables IDEO and DEA will be positive. Considering that all other 
effects remain constant, the rational voter will most certainly reward the leaders with 
best performances, as well as the candidates with similar ideological positions. 
The same thing happens with the variables REC and DPREC: in both cases the 
aim is to identify the influence over the electoral results of the information gathered and 
the candidate’s sympathetic figure, which are most likely to favour him. 
Finally, the theory suggests that the coefficient ￿4, associated to the variable 
DPREC  will  be  negative.  In  municipalities  with  fewer  inhabitants,  the  social 
interchange is usually inferior, which increases the costs of accessing information. In 
this context, it is expected that the amount of information collected and associated to the 
name of the candidate assume a greater significance for those communities. 
We  have  estimated  equation 9  by ordinary least squares, and the results are 
presented in Table 3 (the t-statistics are in parentheses): 
    A first analysis of the results confirms the globally significant character of the 
regression, which allows the rejection of the null hypothesis according to which ￿i = 0 
(i= 0,...,5) with a level of significance inferior to 0,1%. 
All  the  estimated  parameters  show  features  concurrent  to  what  was  theoretically 
expected:  they  are  all  positive,  except  for the coefficient associated  to the variable 
DPREC, which, as expected, is negative. 
The analysis of the statistical significance of the individual coefficients shows 
that the voter is not particularly sensitive to the candidate’s performance, at least not in 
terms of the way it was represented. Despite the fact that the coefficient associated to 
the variable DEA in both estimations shows the theoretically expected feature, the t-
statistic does not permit the rejection of the null hypothesis, according to which ￿1 = 0, 
at the usual levels of significance. 
Ideology  and  particularly  the  candidate’s  sympathetic  image  apparently 
constitute  influential  aspects  in  the  voter’s  decision.  Considering  everything  else 
constant, the fact that the candidate in office at the date of the election has decided to 





27.  The  fact  that  he  has  been  in  office  for  at  least  two  mandates 
apparently has no decisive influence in the final result. 
The impact of the candidate’s sympathetic figure, a consequence of having been 
in a public office, seems to be higher in municipalities with less population per Km
2, 
considering  the  negative  sign  of  the  DPREC  coefficient.  Municipalities,  which  are 
similar in other aspects but have less population per square Km, tend to benefit more a 
candidate that intends to be re-elected. 
 
5. Some Conclusions 
On the whole, our empirical results seem to correspond more to the premise of 
the “rationally ignorant” voter than to the alternative premise of the “efficient voter”: 
not only the competence of the candidate seems to have little influence in the voter’s 
decision, but also the determinant factor that explains the electoral results seems to 
reside on the candidate’s sympathetic figure. It is precisely in a context of rational 
ignorance  that  the  public  recognition  of  the  candidate,  his  name  and  political  past 
assume more relevance. Consequently, factors like the candidate’s sympathetic figure 
and charisma may overlap a rigorous evaluation of his performance, giving the more 
popular candidates an advantage in relation to the other candidates. The recognition and 
social visibility of those who have been in office represent valuable assets in the contest 
against their opponents. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  fact  this effect is inversely related to the number of 
inhabitants per square Km in a given municipality suggests that the voters will be more 
influenced by similar factors whenever the costs of information are potentially higher. 
This result, similar to the conclusions reached by Yen et al. (1990), agrees with the 
logic of the rational voter, who evaluates costs and benefits when having to decide 
whether to acquire more information. 
Despite all this, these results are not definite in terms of inferring the voter’s 
rational  ignorance.  This  would  only  happen  if  it  were  clear  that  the  candidate’s 
competence had been carefully pondered and, unfortunately, it is impossible to establish 
that. Firstly, because it is not conclusive that all the variables relevant for the evaluation 
of the efficiency-cost variable have been considered. Despite the fact that the variables 
                                                
27 In no municipalities included in the sample did the candidate elected in 1993 run for a second mandate 




included made it possible to explain almost 90% of the local administration current 
expenses, some areas have not been considered, since there was not enough credible 
information  available
28.    Secondly,  several  difficulties  in  quantifying  the  selected 
variables forced us to find compromises, in order to fill in the information gaps. The 
impact, although appropriately reduced, of those information gaps may have introduced 
deviations in the results.  
All things considered, although we are confident that the overall results point out 
to the ignorance of the voters, we defend the necessity to elaborate new studies in this 
field, in  order to improve the method  applied in  this study and fill in some of the 






















                                                
28 We are particularly referring to the cultural intervention, for which it was impossible to determine the 




Appendix 1: DEA efficiency results 
Municipality  1994  1995  1996  1997  Average  Standard Error 
Albergaria a Velha  100  100  94,59  69,32  90,98  14,66 
Alenquer  91,57  100  70,47  100  90,51  13,94 
Aljustrel  100  99,29  100  100  99,82  0,36 
Ansião  100  89,5  100  93,22  95,68  5,21 
Arganil  73,66  71,44  68,76  67,9  70,44  2,62 
Arouca  100  100  86,97  89,56  94,13  6,86 
Aveiro  100  100  100  100  100,00  0,00 
Beja  83,42  84,74  78,35  100  86,63  9,33 
Benavente  88,61  84,55  76  78,26  81,86  5,78 
Caldas da Rainha  100  93,61  100  100  98,40  3,19 
Castelo Branco  100  100  100  100  100,00  0,00 
Chamusca  85,01  77,52  80,08  73,03  78,91  5,00 
Entroncamento  100  100  100  100  100,00  0,00 
Estremoz  71,18  81,6  76,47  66,15  73,85  6,67 
Évora  100  89,01  100  95,84  96,21  5,19 
Faro  76,34  88,36  93,11  100  89,45  9,96 
Figueira da Foz  73,13  84,21  100  74,88  83,06  12,30 
Grândola  48,08  55,23  50,47  44,94  49,68  4,34 
Idanha-a-Nova  100  100  100  100  100,00  0,00 
Ilhavo  100  99,25  100  100  99,81  0,38 
Marinha Grande  100  90,12  92,41  72,33  88,72  11,71 
Obidos  94,49  100  95,96  99,11  97,39  2,60 
Odemira  53,41  45,43  44,3  42,05  46,30  4,95 
Oliveira de Azemeis  100  98,43  89,36  93,23  95,26  4,88 
Penacova  93,69  88,82  87,16  84,07  88,44  4,02 
Sabugal  70,09  74,23  70,51  67,12  70,49  2,92 
Santiago do Cacém  61,78  61,7  59,44  65,18  62,03  2,37 
São João da Madeira  100  95,85  90,43  100  96,57  4,54 
São Pedro do Sul  70,94  58,92  55,44  66,76  63,02  7,09 
Seia  97,01  100  95,33  83,58  93,98  7,20 
Sever do Vouga  100  100  98,03  100  99,51  0,99 
Tavira  62,69  70,43  71,54  71,09  68,94  4,19 
Torres Vedras  81,81  68,62  73,55  60,3  71,07  9,01 
Trancoso  75,87  73,06  86,94  85,42  80,32  6,89 
Vale de Cambra  100  100  100  100  100,00  0,00 
Valença  100  83,15  82,84  73,29  84,82  11,11 
Vendas Novas  95,81  100  99,34  89,05  96,05  5,02 
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Table 1: Description of the variables used 
Variable  Description  Source 
CEXPi  Current expenditure of the municipality i, in 
thousand contos (1000 PTE) 
INE 
PUPILSi  Number of pupils attending the first four grades 
of primary schools in the municipality i  
INE 
ROADSi  Number of km. of municipal roads in the 
municipality i  
Marktest 
WASTEi  Urban solid wastes collected in the municipality i, 
in thousands of tons 
INE 




SEWAGEi  Population served by residual waters drainage 
systems, in percentage 
INE 
 
Table 2: Estimates of the Parameters of a Total Cost Function (n = 37) 
                 
   C  ln PUPILS  ln ROADS  ln WASTE  ln WATER  ln SEWAGE  COMP  Adj. R
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*t- statistics-t in parentheses 
 
 
Table 3: Estimates of the Parameters of a Electoral Approval Function  
  Independent Variables   
  C  DEA  IDEO  REC  NDREC  DPREC  R
2  




























   t-statistics in parentheses.  
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